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A COMPARISON OF
U.S. - CANADIAN EXCESS CONDEMNATION,
EXPROPRIATION AND PROPERTY TAKING
A Valid Form of Governmental Recoupment of Added Value?
Andrew Bechard
Introduction
In the United States, all levels of government are be-
ing made painfully aware of a crumbling infrastructure.I The
continuing deterioration of this structural base threatens
to seriously debilitate municipal and urban centers through
exacting major capital expense and investment, which pro-
ves to be problematic for state and municipal budget of-
fices. The past ten to fifteen years have seen a political shift
toward public policies which de-emphasize social service
and infrastructure expenditures on the federal, state and
municipal level.2 The advent of fiscal restraint in these areas
and the resultant deterioration necessitates new ways of
approaching infrastructure building and rebuilding, while
also allowing intelligent and planned expansion. If the huge
structural bases of U.S. cities and regional areas are to be
maintained and expanded, new methodologies of finance
and development must be developed which can offset the
enormous capital expenditures required.
This essay will examine a method that a municipality,
city, public authority or other public entity might use for
offsetting some of the expense involved in infrastructure
development. Two land planning legal doctrines will be ad-
dressed, the first being the U.S. doctrine of excess con-
demnation.
Excess condemnation is the exercise of eminent do-
main powers (a fifth amendment "taking"') wherein the con-
demning authority takes more land than is physically
necessary for the public improvement. 4 In fact, the term
"excess condemnation" is a misnomer. The term does not
mean an "excess" beyond that which is legally permitted,
but refers to an excess of property needed to construct the
public project.'
An additional inquiry will be made into the Canadian
doctrine of expropriation - the taking of land without the
consent of the owner by an expropriating authority in the
exercise of its statutory powers. 6 To provide a coherent
and concrete analysis in which such methods may be us-
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ed, this essay begins with an examination of a particular
urban problem, and then moves on to a doctrinal exposi-
tion revealing how each approach allows for a governmental
recoupment of the added value bestowed on private pro-
perty by a public project. Significant value increases in
private property are often created by the installation of
public facilities; a recapture of a portion of the added value
which society creates is rational and appropriate and is
discussed within.
Urban Mass Rail Transit as Example
7
In an attempt to reduce the crush of intercity private
auto traffic, conserve energy resources, and reduce
metropolitan pollution problems, more than fifteen North
American cities have constructed new urban mass rail tran-
sit systems in the past two decades. 8 In addition, many
of the urban rail transit systems existent prior to 1965 have
made additions to their original lines. 9 While the past ten
to fifteen years have seen the advent of fiscal restraint in
social service and infrastructure expenditures on the federal,
state, and local level,' 0 there is still a general continuing
need for urban mass rail transit in North American
megalopolis regions and medium to small size cities.
The birth of the U.S. Urban Mass Transportation Ad-
ministration (UMTA) occurred in January of 1968, " with
UMTA established as an agency operating under the um-
brella of the Department of Transportation. While the Ur-
ban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 established the first
comprehensive program of federal assistance for urban
mass transportation, the Urban Mass Transportation
Assistance Act of 19702 included substantially increased
funding and officially designated UMTA to provide con-
solidated management for all federal mass transit pro-
grams. '3
Although a flurry of activity was taking place on the
urban transportation front in the late 1960's resulting in
the UMTA, that activity has yet to substantially subside
as evidenced by the recently completed Buffalo (Fall 1986),
Portland (Fall 1986) and Atlanta (Summer 1986) systems.
Nevertheless, as stated above, federal funding com-
mitments have not matched existing interest. The reasons
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for such continued interest remain much as they were dur-
ing the 1960's and 70's building heyday of urban rail tran-
sit systems, primarily the failure of private
auto/highway/public bus transportation systems to meet
the peak demands of the suburban and ring neighborhood
to downtown work commute.' 4 During the four peak rush
hours of every working day the surface highway gridlock
experienced by urban centers can be greatly reduced by
tens of thousands of private vehicles when underground
rapid rail transit is utilized.'" In addition to the physical defi-
ciency of the urban center in dealing with traffic, there are
other social factors making urban rail systems desirable. '
6
In light of the continuing needs for urban mass rail tran-
sit construction in the present atmosphere of fiscal restraint
and pragmatism, excess condemnation doctrine may assist
cities or transit authorities in partially defraying some of
the tremendous capital expenditures involved,' 7 or system
operating costs. Wherever a subway station is located in
an urban area, that area instantly becomes accessible to
a larger number of persons who, because of their
carlessness or physical handicap, may not have been able
to frequent that area before. The station area immediately
becomes a hub of social interaction, a magnet for com-
muters, shoppers and anyone traveling within the city.
Because of the heightened traffic, retail possibilities in-
crease, commercial rents increase as do residential rents
and property values in general.
What we now have is an area with "added value"
resulting from the construction of the subway station. The
private property owners in close proximity have reaped a
monetary windfall from the new area hub, built as a public
project and funded with public monies.
The major question that this paper will deal with is
should those private property owners be permitted to re-
tain that windfall or is it possible for the public entity to
reclaim or recoup the "added value" to the properties sur-
rounding the public project? Should it be possible for the
public entity to reclaim the added value along a rail transit
route for example, if that increase in value did not necessari-
ly constitute a net increment to the city's total land value?
Furthermore, if the transit line is a catalyst which made
possible the realization of potential values that would not
otherwise have developed, should there be promotion or
prohibition of the use of excess condemnation doctrine to
recapture that added wealth concentration?
Excess Condemnation Law in the United States
The supreme power cannot take from any man
any part of his property without his own con-
sent. For the preservation of property being the
end of government, and that for which men
enter into society, it necessarily supposes and
requires that the people should have property,
without which they must be supposed to lose
that by entering into society which was the end
for which they entered into it; too gross an ab-
surdity for any man to own. Men, therefore, in
society having property, they have such a right
to the goods, which by the law of the communi-
ty are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take
them, or any part of them, from them without
their own consent; without this they have not
property at all.'
8
J. Locke
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were heavily in-
fluenced by natural law theorists such as John Locke. In
the words of James Madison, "govemment is instituted no
less for the protection of the property, than of the persons
of individuals." 19 There are broad limitations written into
the U.S. Constitution that limit the power of eminent do-
main as a result of these philosophical underpinnings.
Eminent domain in its broadest sense, is the power
of a sovereign entity to take property for public use without
the owner's consent.2" The fifth amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides us with the relevant language:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."
Additionally, fourteenth amendment language regarding
property rights 2' have caused fifth amendment protections
to be held applicable to the states.22 Many states have
adopted their own fifth amendment within their own state
constitutions 23 since a great deal of condemnation is done
by the states or state empowered entities. 4
The law of eminent domain requires a two-fold inquiry
in any situation in which a property owner claims that he
has been deprived of his property without just compensa-
tion.YFirst, it must be determined if the individual in ques-
tion was deprived of his property without just
compensation. Stated more simply, was the individual fairly
remunerated for any taking that has occurred? Second, has
the government the power to take the property in ques-
tion? An exercise in eminent domain is only valid where
it is found to be for some "public use". The second part
of the inquiry measures the scope of eminent domain and
involves an inquiry as to the objective for which the power
is invoked. 25 This examination of the growing definition
of public use will be the major inquiry into excess condem-
nation.
Public Use26
The doctrine of required public "use" has been pro-
gressively liberalized over the course of American
jurisprudence. Formerly it was construed to demand ac-
tual physical use by the public. 28 This view was weakened
in the late nineteenth century as courts and legislatures
began to recognize exceptions to the public use require-
ment for such instrumentalities of commerce as utility and
railroad rights-of-way. 29 Public "purpose" became the
substitute criterion for public use. This public purpose doc-
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trine has evolved into the concept that if the exercise of
eminent domain in a given case will materially benefit the
public or a considerable portion thereof, as by enhancing
the public welfare of the prosperity of the community, the
exercise is for a public purpose and valid. 30 This generous
attitude has been greatly nourished by modem cases regar-
ding urban renewal. 31 Urban renewal involves redevelop-
ment authorities, which condemn "blighted" areas, see to
their razing, and then resell the land to private parties. To
justify investing these agencies with the power of eminent
domain, the courts went to great pains to destroy any
vestiges of the theory that direct public ownership and use
was always essential to public purpose.32
This progression has expanded to the point where,
given the proper circumstances, a government may take
an individual citizen's private property and transfer it to
another private party or corporation to satisfy some
ultimately pliable public need. Municipalities seeking
economic advantage or reprieve have used their power on
behalf of private enterprise in return for the promise of jobs,
tax revenues, or other, less obvious benefits. 33 Such was
the case when, in 1980, the General Motors Corporation
asked the City of Detroit to buy and demolish everything
that stood on the 465 acre tract that the dompany wanted
for a new assembly plant. The city agreed, and in Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,34 the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the plan. The plaintiffs, some of the
4,200 residents of the old inner- city neighborhood, pro-
tested that the city had unconstitutionally condemned their
1,100 plus homes for the benefit of General Motors. The
city answered that the condemnation served the public's
need to stop the exodus of jobs from Detroit. With
unemployment in Detroit at eighteen percent and the ci-
ty's economic mainstay, the auto industry, facing record
losses, the city welcomed the potential of six thousand
jobs.35 Quoting the landmark urban renewal case Bernan
v. Parker, the Michigan Supreme Court wrote that "when
a legislature speaks, the public interest has been declared
in terms 'well-nigh conclusive.' "36 Thus, while what con-
stitutes a public use/purpose is ultimately a matter of con-
stitutional interpretation and therefore a judicial question,
heavy considerations are given to legislative determinations.
In fact, seldom are legislative proposals invalidated. 37
Courts have generally stopped addressing the issue of what
the public use/purpose clause permits. They treat legislative
authorization as raising the presumption that if a public
use exists, there is a presumption of constitutionality.38 The
Minnesota Supreme Court, upholding the condemnation
of an office building for a major downtown renewal plan,
wrote:
If it appears that the record contains some
evidence, however informal, that the tak-
ing serves a public purpose, there is nothing left
for the courts to pass upon. 39
(emphasis added)
On the other side of the public use question are jurists
such as Justice Van Voorhis of the New York Court of
Appeals, who, in writing one of many dissents on the public
use issue, in Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York
Authority, wrote:
This is not all a matter of policy for the
Legislature. It is the function of the courts to
give effect to the Constitutions, State and
Federal. It is the solemn duty of the courts to
enforce the constitutional limitation against tak-
ing private property by eminent domain except
for public purposes. 0
This view is shared by those courts that read the public
use/purpose clause narrowly, but expansion has occurred
in Courtesy Sandwich Shop and in other cases.4'
The Recoupment Theory of
Excess Condemnation
There are several theories of excess condemnation, in-
cluding the remnant theory which advocates the taking of
extra land - the remnant - if that land has been rendered
worthless by the original taking. There is also the protec-
tive theory, whereby excess land adjacent to the public im-
provement but unnecessary to its construction is taken so
that the government may control the use of that land either
by holding the property or by selling it with the appropriate
use restrictions attached. Finally, there is recoupment
theory, the area where this inquiry will be focused. Here,
the condemning entitity is allowed to attempt to recapture
the value bestowed on adjacent property by public improve-
ment through the condemnation and sale of the adjacent
property.42
Recoupment theory is not a new concept. Napoleon
III employed it to finance the construction of many of the
broad avenues of Paris still in use today.4 3 Recoupment
is a European concept and therefore there is little experience
with it in the United States; however, recoupment remains
a major device in the European and Canadian financing
of public projects.44
There is little case law which speaks directly to the
problem of recoupment and this no doubt is due to the fact
that U.S. cities have traditionally considered recoupment
to be a typically foreign device for financing public works.
But an aforementioned New York case Courtesy Sandwich
Shop45 held that a taking for the purpose of stimulating
trade and commerce with a reletting to private interests is
valid. The taking for the New York World Trade Center
was upheld in the face of a charge that the Port Authority
intended to rent a substantial portion of this project to
tenants only remotely connected with trade and commerce,
solely to defer the cost of the project. Although recent cases
have not decided the validity of recoupment per se, they
definitely have set a precedent for the government to
finance public projects through excess condemnation so
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long as there is some public purpose associated with the
project. 46
More recently the concept of recapturing conferred
value was accepted by Chief Judge Breitel of the New York
Court of Appeals in Penn Central Transportation Com-
pany u. City of New York.4 7 In the context of determining
whether a property owner was able to obtain a reasonable
return on his investment, Breitel recognized that much of
the value of a piece of urban property was not the result
of private effort but actually resulted from opportunities for
exploitation made available by a community. Breitel believ-
ed that society was entitled its due to the extent it had
created value.
This opinion tends to echo the social philosophy
espoused by the American economist Henry George.
Writing in the nineteenth century, George proposed that
the value of land is created by the settlement of people
around it and not by anything the owner has done (ex-
cluding any improvements he has made upon the land, e.g.,
grading, construction of buildings, etc.). If the value of land
is created by the community, George's main premise was
that we should take that which rightly belongs to the whole
before we take that which rightfully belongs to the in-
dividual. George was of the opinion that all land should
be taxed to recover this "unearned value" which rightfully
belongs to the community but which, for practical
necessities, we permit individuals to hold:
The truth is, the market value of land is merely
the reflection of the value of the productive
capital placed upon it and in its immediate
vicinity. It has no real value of its own; it costs
nothing to produce; but since the laws have en-
dowed it with the vital principle of wealth by
subjecting it to individual ownership, it can no
longer be obtained without giving in exchange
for it an equivalent portion of the capital pre-
sent and designed to concur with it in the pro-
duction of wealth.4
8
Both Brietel's and George's theories claim to* recap-
ture for the community a value which belongs to the
community and not the private land owner. In America,
the historical weight of the natural law theories of proper-
ty proposed by Locke, Blackstone, Vattel, and others
dominate. 49 It is generally because of these ideological
origins and constitutional rights theories that there persists
an "American" resistance towards government's involve-
ment in the sphere of acquiring land and selling it for pro-
fit, even when that profit is conferred by a governmental
project.
Expropriation Law in Canada
Because of the inherently different parliamentary
governmental structure in Canada and its heavy reliance
on European politics, philosophy and attitudes toward land
and its value, legal scholars must look not so much at con-
stituting documents and common law for evidence of ex-
propriation law; instead, attention must be directed to the
political, parliamentary product or the statute. The first ex-
propriation legislation to be enacted in Canada was the
Public Works Act of the Province of Canada of 1841.50
It gave to the Board of Works power to take the land
necessary or useful to the performance of any public work,
and provided that the compensation would be fixed by
three arbitrators.5 After the Canadian Confederation this
statute became the Public Works Act of 1867. It gave the
Minister of Public Works the right to take lands, (or an in-
terest therein) streams or watercourses necessary in his opi-
nion for the use, construction, and maintenance of any
public work.5 2 While the statutes conferring this ex-
propriative power are very detailed in how expropriation
procedures are to be carried out, and exactly what may
be expropriated, the governmental minister's opinion
becomes the all important determinant.
53
Every expropriation statute and the governmental ex-
ercise of that power must follow general principles, the first
principle being that expropriation power must be based on
statute.54 This principle is exemplified first in the case of
Kingston & Pembroke Ry. v. Murphy 5 where the company,
by special legislation, was given the power, during the
period of construction, to expropriate all the land necessary
for a railway line. The company in order to qualify for a
subsidy from the City of Kingston declared the construc-
tion completed. Subsequently, wishing to extend the
railway one mile further into Kingston, it attempted to ex-
propriate additional lands. It was held that it could not do
so because the power to expropriate, being purely statutory,
ceased upon the completion of the line.56
The next general principle of expropriation is a strict
construction of statute. In a more modem case we find On-
tario Justice Blackburn stating: "It is clear that the burden
lies on those who seek to establish that the legislature in-
tended to take away the private rights of individuals to show
that by express words or by necessary implication such
an intention appears."" Other language can by found ex-
pressing the tremendous power of expropriation: "The
power of expropriation is such an interference with the right
of property that it should not readily be implied.""'
The final general principle is that all formalities in the
statute must be strictly fulfilled. In Quebec, if the requisite
formalities for expropriation are not carried out, property
taken for public purposes is taken illegally, and the owner
can recover it by petitory or possessory action or can take
a direct action for indemnity. 9 In the Common Law Pro-
vinces an entry upon land without the owners consent or
without the fulfillment of the formalities provided under a
statute giving the right to expropriate is a trespass for which
damages may be awarded or an injunction obtained.6"
The general course of the procedural steps found in
an expropriating component of a statute are basically:
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1) Notice of intention to expropriate;
2) inquiry;
3) approval;
4) expropriation;
5) Statutory offer and payment;
6) negotiation;
7) arbitration; and finally
8) possession.6 1
While the formulation of these general rules may sound
extremely restrictive, there is in fact a method for all govem-
mental entities to opt out of these restrictions under the
umbrella of ministerial opinion. In the cases that have been
examined so far it may appear that there are strict limits
within the statutes and the case law of Canada. However,
a closer look reveals that the statutes leave it to the discre-
tion of the Minister to decide what and how much
land is necessary for a public work.62 Moreover, it has been
held that a judicial review of the Minister's opinion is out-
side of the courts' jurisdiction:
The Minister having deemed it advisable to ex-
propriate, as provided by the Expropriation Act,
has exercised his statutory discretion, and the
Court has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal or in
review of such decision. These questions are
political in their nature and not judicial.... The
Courts cannot enquire into the motives which
actuate the executive or governmental
authorities or into the propriety of their deci-
sion.
6 3
Furthermore, in R v. Beech,6 the Minister of Railways
had instituted proceedings to expropriate land, including
that of the defendant, at Churchill, Manitoba, for the Hud-
son Bay Railroad terminus. Beech alleged that his land was
not necessary for the purpose and that in fact a great part
of it had not been so used. The Minister testified that he
had been advised to take the whole of the east peninsula
at Churchill, including Beech's land, to avoid speculative
land transactions. Justice MacLean wrote that, "(i)f in the
minister's judgement the land thus taken is necessary for
a public work, then I think it is not open to review."6 -5 Thus
there is a body of case law giving a great deal of excessorial
condemnation power to the political appointments of
ministers with portfolio within the Dominion and Provinces
of Canada.
A Comparison of the U.S.
and Canadian Doctrines
It is clear that there are legal differences in two coun-
tries that are otherwise very similar in culture and
geography. If a governmental entity in the United States
attempts to exercise the power of eminent domain for a
purpose other than a "public use", the citizen can do more
than seek judicial review for just compensation; the citizen
may be able to enjoin the condemnation. If a govemmen-
tal entity in Canada exercises its power of expropriation,
it can, as long as it does so within the confines of the
statutory enabling act, expropriate as much as the minister
possessing the power thinks is necessary. There is little op-
portunity to enjoin the expropriation, and no constitutional
claims can be made. The only claim that can be made is
that for compensation, and as a result there is voluminous
Canadian case law on the expropriation topics of assess-
ment, compensation for injurious affection or consequen-
tial damage, indemnity for forcible dispossession, and
appeal from award.
66
What does this point to in a general manner if we wish-
ed to distinguish between the two countries? The general
political philosophies are the most easy to determine. When
dealing with windfall recapture in excess condemnation in
the United States, many regard this practice as
unAmerican.6 7 Many Americans consider the increase in
property value, through rezoning or from nearby public pro-
jects, rightfully belonging to the private property owner as
a vested property right, despite the typical state's constitu-
tional provisions prohibiting gifts of public funds to private
entities.
68
Hagman and Misczynski, in their book Windfalls for
Wipeouts give the typically American reformist view of
windfall recapture:
There are very good reasons for windfall recap-
ture. It is a good revenue source, and the com-
munity is asking only for a return of increased
land-value wealth it creates. In addition, wind-
fall recapture is less socialistic than public land
ownership, a competing technique for keeping
land-value increases in the public domain.69
This comment demonstrates the differences between
the two systems of government. Canada, drawing on
English and French legal traditions and contemporary
political movements in those countries, is more willing to
attempt a more socialist route in building and moderniz-
ing its urban infrastructures. The Toronto Transit Com-
mission and The Montreal Urban Transport Commission
have the expropriative power to condemn with the objec-
tive of recoupment 0 and land banking.7 ' There is little that
a condemnee could do to enjoin either commission from
acquiring the land in question. However, if a similar authori-
ty in the United States was empowered by its state
legislature to condemn in excess with the purpose of
recoupment of added value, such an action would be
greeted with public outcry and subsequent attempts to en-
join it in the courts using the public use clause of the state
constitution.
Conclusion
Canada and the U.S. have many of the same assump-
tions about property and how property should be ad-
ministered. However, because of political traditions there
8 IN THE PUBuC INTEREST
is a much stronger public and private interest distinction 72
in the U.S. than there is in Canada.73 But in recouping add-
ed value from public works there is much more of an op-
portunity for potentially disabling and individualistic legal
intervention to prevent necessary infrastructure rebuilding
in the United States. The conclusion those in the U.S. may
want to draw upon is that which was articulated in R. v.
Imperial Bank,74 - that questions of excess condemna-
tion are political in their nature and not judicial.
Land planning battles need to be fought out in the
legislature, at the polling booth and on the streets, among
citizens. There is little place for the land planning battle
being fought out in the courthouse, among lawyers, judges
and propertied clients. A more political and inclusive route
should be taken to allow all citizens to participate in land
planning decisions. This route should allow such decisions
to be made more freely of individual, legal, profit-motivated,
capitalist and regressive concerns. After all, how can com-
munal, progressive concerns be prioritized when property
is part of a market economy?
Whenever property is taken, individual citizens have
to suffer a burden which can be satisfied monetarily through
a compensation at fair market value. But can these people
be compensated for the distress and loss of identity in the
destruction of their sense of community?" It seems clear
that they cannot. The value of community is something
which cannot be assessed in a monetary figure or expressed
in market terms:
It is obvious from their conduct that the
Poletowners cannot be made whole by
monetary just compensation. After all, an emi-
nent domain taking of their homes and
neighborhood, to be accompanied by compen-
sation payments, is exactly what they are
resisting. In these circumstances, we can easi-
ly see that property may represent more than
money because it may represent things that
money itself can't buy - place, position; relation-
ship, roots, community, solidarity, status - yes,.
and security too .... 7
It is an easy task to propose that excess condemna-
tion is an appropriate and rational doctrine which could
be effectively used by intelligent and planned communities
for rebuilding and measured growth. But do cities often
grow in intelligent or planned directions, or are cities ac-
tually governed by market forces pushing and pulling on
what can be defined as "public purpose" as the Poletown
case so clearly illustrates?
For property taking to be used intelligently, and without
abuse of power, what may be needed is a "niceness"
analysis.77 Such an analysis would be oriented, not toward
a community of the dominant class, which seems to be
the class which we must all be or aspire to be in if we are
to participate fully in American life, but toward the com-
munities that each of us actually live in, work in and
socialize in. Essential to such an analysis would be an at-
tempt at an understanding of the intricacies, cultures, sub-
cultures and nuances of each community as elements of
a city. Without such understanding marginalization,
displacement and insecurity about the possibility of com-
munity and the potential of the city as concept will persist:
[he city chose ... to carve a "green field" out
of an urban setting which ultimately required
sweeping away a tightly-knit residential enclave
of first- and second-generation Americans, for
may of whom their home was their single most
valuable and cherished asset and their stable
ethnic neighborhood the unchanging symbol of
the security and quality of their lives. 8
Each of us acting as public citizens with intelligence
and sensitivity to all of the diverse elements which make
up the concept of city, can bring planning decisions down
to a rooted and democratic street level. This essay has
shown that recoupment is legally permissible, and perhaps
a permissible methodology, but only if its use is sensitive
enough to know when to tear down, when to build, and
when to preserve the communities which we all must live in.
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